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Abstract 
Modern DSGE models are microfounded and have deep parameters that should be invariant 
to changes in economic policy, so in principle they are not subject to the Lucas critique. But 
the literature has already established that misspecification issues also cause parameter 
instability after policy changes in DSGE models. This paper will look at the implications of 
parameter shifts for econometric policy evaluation, to see whether policy advice derived from 
DSGE models would have differed fundamentally from that which the policymakers of the 
1970s derived from their reduced-form Phillips curves. The results show drift in most 
parameters, including those that are supposedly structural (such as the share of capital in 
production, habits or the elasticity of labor supply to the real wage), and major shifts in the 
impulse response functions derived from the real-time estimation of the model. After the 
expansionary monetary shocks of the early 1970s, a standard DSGE model would have 
behaved very similarly to an old-style Phillips curve, with marked shifts in parameter values 
and impulse response functions. 
Keywords: Macroeconomics, DSGE, Lucas Critique. 
JEL Classification: C11, C32, E32, E60. 
 
Resumen 
Los modelos DSGE modernos están microfundamentados, y sus parámetros son estructurales, 
así que en principio deberían ser invariantes ante cambios de política económica y no estar 
sujetos a la crítica de Lucas. Pero la literatura ha encontrado que problemas de 
especificación generan inestabilidad en los parámetros tras cambios de política económica 
también en modelos DSGE. Este artículo estudia las implicaciones de estos cambios en los 
parámetros para la evaluación de políticas económicas, tratando de comprobar si las 
conclusiones obtenidas utilizando un modelo DSGE habrían sido fundamentalmente diferentes 
de las que los policymakers de la década de 1970 derivaron de sus curvas de Phillips de 
forma reducida. Los resultados muestran inestabilidad en la mayoría de parámetros del 
modelo, incluyendo aquellos que son supuestamente estructurales (como el peso del capital 
en la función de producción, los hábitos en el consumo, o la elasticidad de la oferta de 
trabajo al salario real), y cambios muy importantes en las funciones de impulso respuesta 
derivadas de una estimación en tiempo real del modelo. La conclusión es que, tras la 
expansión monetaria de principios de los años setenta, un modelo DSGE estándar se habría 
comportado de forma muy similar a una curva de Phillips de forma reducida, con importantes 
cambios en los valores de los parámetros estimados y en las funciones de impulso 
respuesta. 
Palabras clave: macroeconomía, DSGE, crítica de Lucas. 
Códigos JEL: C11, C32, E32, E60.  
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1 Introduction 
Lucas (1976) drew attention to the fact that reduced-form models, while very useful for 
forecasting, were not suitable for econometric policy evaluation: when a change in 
economic policy is introduced, agents may react, changing their expectations and 
behaviour, and this will shift the parameters of that reduced-form model. For example, 
policymakers might estimate a Phillips curve and see a trade-off between output and 
inflation, but if they tried to exploit this trade-off, agents would notice, they would adjust 
their behaviour to their new expectations of higher future inflation, and the effect on output 
would be smaller than what policymakers expected; later on, policymakers would re-
estimate their model with new data, and would find that the trade-off was in fact less 
advantageous than initially thought. The solution for this is to use structural, microfounded 
models, with deep parameters: by estimating not the relationship between output and 
inflation, but the coefficients of the utility function of consumers and of firms’ production 
function, policymakers could attain a model that is invariant to policy changes, and 
therefore better suited for econometric policy evaluation. 
DSGE models should, in principle, meet these criteria. But, as shown by Cogley and 
Yagihashi (2010) and by Chang, Kim and Schorfheide (2011), a model which is not correctly 
specified (e.g. because it uses the wrong specification for price stickiness, or because it does 
not take into account agent heterogeneity) will also display parameter instability issues in 
response to policy shocks, and may provide inaccurate policy advice. Cogley and Yagihashi 
(2010) use a model with state-dependent pricing to generate data, simulating a policy shift 
designed to resemble the change in US monetary policy around the time of the Volcker 
disinflation; they then use those data to estimate a model with time-dependent pricing à la 
Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996); they find that due to this model misspecification “private-sector 
parameters shift across regimes, some by an economically meaningful amount”, but also that 
in terms of welfare the cost of using the wrongly-specified model to derive optimal policy is 
relatively minor. For their part, Chang, Kim and Schorfheide (2011) generate simulated data 
using a heterogeneous-agents model in which households have to insure themselves against 
idiosyncratic income risks (an economy where equilibrium outcomes depend on the cross-
sectional distribution of households’ wealth and earnings, which in turn depend on the policy 
regime), and then use those data to estimate a representative-agent model; they find that “if 
the representative-agent model is estimated with data from the heterogeneous-agents 
economy under different policy regimes, several important parameters vary considerably”, 
including preference and technology parameters; that “the prediction bias due to imperfect 
aggregation is substantially larger than the prediction intervals that reflect parameter 
estimation uncertainty”; and also that “the representative-agent model that abstracts from 
cross-sectional heterogeneity on the household side can potentially mislead fiscal policy 
predictions”, with important welfare losses caused by deriving policy advice from a 
misspecified DSGE model. 
In another branch of the literature, empirical studies have found parameter drift in 
estimated DSGE models, using very different approaches and methodologies. Fernandez-
Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007) estimate a relatively standard DSGE model, expanded to 
allow for parameter drift, and find that all the parameters related to the reduced-form 
mechanisms introduced in the model as a way to match the observed data (Calvo pricing, 
indexation, rigidities in consumption and investment, Taylor rule, etc.) seem to be evolving 
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over time. Their methodology is uniquely elegant, in the sense that agents in the model are 
aware that these coefficients are changing, and that they may also change in the future1, but 
it is also somewhat limited: they do not derive a formal test to check whether a parameter is 
stable or not, and, because of computational requirements (related to the particle filter they 
have to use for the estimation), they only allow one parameter to change in each exercise, 
while all the others remain constant, which could lead to identification issues2. For their part, 
Inoue and Rossi (2008) derive a formal test that checks whether there’s a break point in the 
sample, and identifies the subsets of stable and unstable parameters in the estimation of the 
model. They apply this methodology to the 1959-2004 period, and find that “time variation 
afflicts not only the parameters in the monetary policy reaction function, but also most of the 
parameters in the Euler and IS equations”. 
The first branch of the literature (Cogley and Yagihashi (2010), Chang, Kim and 
Schorfheide (2011)) looks at theoretical issues (parameter consistency and pseudo-true 
values) and uses model-generated data, whereas the second branch (Fernandez-Villaverde 
and Rubio-Ramirez (2007) and Inoue and Rossi (2008)) looks at parameter instability using 
real-world data but has not yet analysed in detail its implications for policy advice. I intend to 
bridge that gap in this paper, at least partially. 
In section 2, I will illustrate the parameter drift issue, with a rolling-window estimation 
of the Smets and Wouters (2007) model which allows all the estimated coefficients to evolve 
over time3. In section 3 (which is the main contribution of this paper), I will consider the 
implications of observed parameter drift for policymaking, looking at the impulse response 
functions of the estimated model and analysing how they change over time. I will carry out a 
pseudo-real-time exercise, which will question whether policy advice derived from estimated 
DSGE models would have differed fundamentally from that which the policymakers of the 
1970s derived from their reduced-form Phillips curves. The results from this pseudo-real-time 
experiment show major shifts in the impulse response functions derived from the successive 
estimations of the model, around the time where expansionary monetary policy was 
implemented. This resembles very closely one of the examples of Lucas (1976): if your model 
is subject to the Lucas critique, it may make you wrongly believe that there is a sizeable trade-
off between output and inflation that can be exploited, but when you try to do so, the 
parameters of your model change, and then you find that the re-estimated models show a 
not-so-advantageous trade-off. Section 4 draws conclusions. 
The aim of this paper is to show, looking at history, that these flaws of DSGE models 
identified by the literature can lead to mistaken policy evaluation at critical times: exactly when 
such policies are implemented. This does not mean that DSGE models are as bad as 
reduced-form models from the 70s or that they should be abandoned, but it does mean that 
they have to be used with caution, in full awareness of these issues. Most economists may 
already be mindful of this, but it is still worth pointing out, since there are also many who 
attribute to these models a degree of perfection that they ultimately seem to lack. 
                                                                          
1. In most other models, agents think that all parameters are fixed and invariant, and that they will remain so for the 
foreseeable future. Even if the exercise shows that all parameters are found to be changing, agents in the model will 
never be aware of this fact, and they will not consider the possibility of future changes in their decision-making. 
2. These issues would be similar to those created by omitted variables in standard regressions: if there is one 
parameter drifting (for example, the Calvo parameter for wages), but the estimation exercise leaves it fixed and only 
allows another parameter to drift (for example, wage indexation), it could wrongly conclude that this second 
parameter is drifting too (if the effects of increasing one or the other are, to some extent, similar). 
3. This is simply a visual illustration, and section 2 does not aim to establish proof of parameter instability in the data: that 
has already been done with a lot more scientific rigour by Inoue and Rossi (2008). 
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2 Rolling-window estimations and parameter drift 
Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007) and Inoue and Rossi (2008) present evidence 
that the parameters of an estimated DSGE model have not been constant over the last few 
decades. I will use a rolling-window estimation exercise to further illustrate this issue. What I 
will present in this section is only suggestive evidence that supposedly deep parameters may 
be drifting, not a formal test that they are doing so at any given statistical significance level4. 
The model I will use is that of Smets and Wouters (2007, AER). I chose this model because it 
has been tweaked for estimation, it is very standard in the literature, and it is similar to those 
used by both Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007) and Inoue and Rossi (2008). 
The data for the estimation will also be that used by Smets and Wouters (2007): growth of 
output, consumption and investment; employment; price and wage inflation; and interest rate; 
the only change is that I updated and expanded their database to include the latest data and 
a longer sample period: Smets and Wouters (2007) use 1966-2004, I will use 1948-2011. The 
estimation uses Bayesian methods, as in Smets and Wouters (2007), and with their prior 
distributions too. 
As in Cantore, Ferroni and Leon-Ledesma (2011), I run a rolling-window estimation5 
of this structural model, and look at the changes over time of the estimated coefficients. Chart 
1 shows the results for a selection of 12 parameters of the model. The graphs include both 
the mean of the posterior distribution, and a 90% confidence interval constructed with the 
data from the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. Table 1 shows the results for all the estimated 
coefficients of the model: the value from Smets and Wouters (2007), the average of the 
means from all the 20-year window estimations, and the maximum and minimum from those 
means. The column labeled “drift” is an indicator that takes the maximum and minimum point 
estimations for each parameter, and checks whether the corresponding 90% confidence 
intervals of the posterior distribution have null intersection6. 
                                                                          
4. For such a formal test, go to the aforementioned paper by Inoue and Rossi (2008). Note that their test has the same 
internal consistency issues as my rolling-window and recursive estimations: even if the agents in the model live in a world 
where parameter changes are possible –and, in fact, observed– they believe that parameters are fixed and will not 
change in the future (but actually, according to Quoidbach, Gilbert and Wilson (2013), that is, to some extent, how 
humans behave). Also, their test looks for a single structural break that affects all parameters at the same point in time; 
my sample is too long for just one single break point (the early 1970s, 1984, and the late 2000s, are all good candidates 
for a break point) and I want to consider the possibility of different parameters changing at different points in time; their 
test could be extended to allow for several break points, but this would further diminish its power (and their own Monte 
Carlo analysis already shows that unrealistically long sample sizes are required for the test to have high power). 
5. The results presented in this section are from a rolling window of 20 years, but I have also repeated the exercise with 
10-year windows and 5-year windows, obtaining results that are qualitatively similar, but slightly more volatile (in any 
case, even for the 5-year windows, clearly less volatile than those from Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007). 
6. This indicator could be related to a structural change test based on Canova and Ortega (2000), but given that I am 
not taking into account many relevant nuances of this particular estimation (unknown break point, correlation 
between different estimated parameters, etc), I make no claims of test size, power, consistency, etc. The tests 
presented in Inoue and Rossi (2008) are a more rigorous way to statistically identify which parameters are stable and 
which are drifting. 
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The first six coefficients of Chart 1 are those from the Fernandez-Villaverde and 
Rubio-Ramirez (2007) exercise: Calvo and indexation parameters for prices and wages, 
and the main parameters of the Taylor rule. These are all reduced-form mechanisms, and 
the fact that most of these coefficients seem to be evolving over time may not be surprising 
to many7. But the other six should definitely be constant: they are deep, structural 
parameters, which describe the utility function of consumers, the production function of 
firms, and the steady state around which the whole model is built. 
                                                                          
7. As an informal test to see whether Calvo and indexation parameters can be seen as really deep parameters or, 
alternatively, as parameters linked to inflation performance and monetary policy, I have repeated this rolling-window 
exercise but estimating only these parameters, keeping all others at their estimated values from the 1948-2011 sample. 
The results are qualitatively similar to those presented in Chart 1: price stickiness has a clear upward trend, wage 
stickiness shows some ups and downs, and indexation parameters display sizeable swings, but are estimated with such 
great uncertainty that it is not possible to draw clear conclusions for them. 
Chart 1: Mode and confidence intervals of 20‐year rolling window estimation
price stickiness wage stickiness Taylor rule: response to inflation
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There are three possible explanations for such drift of supposedly structural 
parameters: perhaps this happens because of misspecification of the model (as illustrated 
by Cogley and Yagihashi (2010) and by Chang, Kim and Schorfheide (2011)), because the 
real world is actually evolving (which, if not captured by the model, is actually a form of 
misspecification), or because of estimation issues (since, as pointed out in Canova and 
Sala (2009), many model parameter estimates are hardly identified). 
If the reason is that the real world is evolving, models will have to take this into account, 
especially if that evolution is related to economic policy. If things such as how much households 
care about their future, or about their past level of consumption, or about their leisure, are 
Table 1: results from the 20‐year rollling window estimati on
S‐W average min max drift
price stickiness 0.65 0.64 0.44 0.83 y
wage stickiness 0.73 0.74 0.60 0.83 y
price indexation 0.22 0.42 0.21 0.70 y
wage indexation 0.59 0.52 0.36 0.67 ‐
subjective quarterly interest rate (discount factor) 0.16 0.22 0.13 0.35 ‐
habits 0.71 0.67 0.47 0.77 y
elasticity of intertemporal substi tut i on (for constant labour) 1.39 1.22 0.84 1.68 y
elasticity of labour supply to real wage 1.92 1.66 0.34 2.30 y
share of capital in production 0.19 0.20 0.14 0.24 y
steady state elasticity of the capital adjustment cost functi on 5.48 4.92 3.54 6.31 ‐
elasticity of the capital utili sat i on adjustment cost functi on 0.54 0.50 0.29 0.73 y
fixed cost 1.61 1.52 1.42 1.63 ‐
Taylor rule: inertia 0.81 0.81 0.71 0.96 y
Taylor rule: response to inflati on 2.03 1.75 1.41 2.00 ‐
Taylor rule: response to output gap 0.08 0.12 0.03 0.18 y
Taylor rule: response to growth of output gap 0.22 0.17 0.07 0.21 y
quarterly trend growth of real GDP 0.43 0.40 0.29 0.60 y
quarterly steady state inflati on rate 0.81 0.68 0.56 0.79 ‐
steady state hours worked ‐0.10 0.79 ‐1.80 2.71 y
stationary TFP shock 0.45 0.47 0.34 0.61 y
price mark‐up shock 0.24 0.17 0.10 0.34 y
wage mark‐up shock 0.52 0.21 0.14 0.38 y
exogenous spending shock 0.46 0.51 0.36 0.90 y
monetary policy shock 0.24 0.21 0.10 0.34 y
investment‐specific technology shock 0.14 0.47 0.30 0.78 y
shock to interest rate paid/received by households 0.25 0.20 0.06 0.29 y
AR ‐ stationary TFP shock 0.96 0.91 0.77 0.99 y
AR ‐ shock to interest rate paid/received by households 0.18 0.52 0.19 0.95 y
AR ‐ exogenous spending shock 0.98 0.88 0.73 0.98 y
response of exogenous spending to TFP shock 0.52 0.53 0.39 0.64 ‐
AR ‐ monetary policy shock 0.12 0.27 0.13 0.54 y
AR ‐ investment‐specific technology shock 0.70 0.67 0.36 0.89 y
AR ‐ price mark‐up shock 0.91 0.64 0.34 0.92 y
MA ‐ price mark‐up shock 0.74 0.55 0.32 0.93 y
AR ‐ wage mark‐up shock 0.97 0.81 0.46 0.97 y
MA ‐ wage mark‐up shock 0.89 0.61 0.37 0.92 y
Estimated values
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changing over time, they could be doing so in response to different economic policies, and then 
any model used for econometric policy evaluation should take into account how this process 
works (how the economic policies it will analyse can alter the behaviour of consumers). 
If, on the other hand, the behaviour of agents in the real world has not changed at a 
deep level (i.e. there are some truly structural parameters that remain constant), and the 
observed drift in coefficients is due to misspecification of the model or to estimation issues, 
then the source of misspecification should be identified and the model “fixed”, or the 
estimation procedure should be improved and the identification issues solved. But that is a 
daunting task. There are lots of possible sources of misspecification and lack of identification, 
and finding a DSGE model that can go through the rolling-window estimation exercise8 
without showing parameter drift is not easy9. 
                                                                          
8. Actually, the proper test would be that of Inoue and Rossi, but its power issues in “small” samples also have to be 
taken into account. 
9. Part of the problem is that the model has to be estimated: it needs to have the ability to match the observed data, and 
this is surprisingly uncommon. For example, a near-flexible-prices version of the Smets and Wouters model, with Calvo 
and indexation parameters set at 0.01, will not lead to acceptable estimation values unless priors are narrowed (some 
other parameters go towards zero or infinity); but narrowing the priors to obtain a good estimation is not a desirable 
alternative, because it can be abused: if it is overdone, the stable-parameters result can be forced. Setting those 
parameters at 0.1 instead of 0.01 makes the estimation work, but is not a solution to model drift anyway: the rolling-
window estimation exercise still suggests that several supposedly deep parameters are evolving over time. The same 
result is obtained if only the Calvo parameters are set to 0.1, or if Calvo, indexation and habits are all set to 0.1. And the 
same result again for more radical departures: replacing rational expectations (which are convenient and impose 
discipline but may not be realistic and could be a source of misspecification) with backward-looking expectations does 
not remove the drift either, even if they are designed to match the behaviour of observed expectations (as proxied by the 
Survey of Professional Forecasters from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia). 
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3 Impulse response functions: the pseudo-real-time exercise 
The previous section has shown some indications that supposedly structural models may not 
be as stable as they should be: deep parameters should remain constant, but a rolling-
window estimation of the model shows them evolving over time. These indications are in line 
with stronger results from previous studies, both for the US economy [Fernández-Villaverde 
and Rubio-Ramírez (2007), Inoue and Rossi (2008)] and for other advanced economies 
[Jerger and Röhe (2012)]. 
The biggest problem with this parameter drift is that it could be caused by policy 
changes, and in that case these models would be unfit to perform econometric policy 
evaluation: policymakers could use a model to evaluate how the economy would react to their 
actions, then make their choices and implement some policies, and finally find that the 
modeled economy has changed and the effect of the policies is not what they anticipated. 
In terms of our model, the real problem would not be that the parameters are drifting, 
but that the impulse response functions of the model may be changing, and that they may be 
doing so in response to policy changes: if the coefficients change but the IRF to the shock 
that represents the policy is mostly unchanged, then parameter drift would not be such a big 
problem. It is therefore important to evaluate not only whether parameters are stable, but also 
how these impulse response functions change when the coefficients of the model evolve over 
time, especially around changes in economic policy. This could be done with the IRFs derived 
from the rolling-window estimation presented in the previous section. But instead of that, in 
this section I will run a pseudo-real-time exercise, looking at the policy advice that a 
policymaker from the 1970s would have derived from the estimation of the Smets-Wouters 
model, and comparing that to the performance of an old-style Phillips Curve estimated using 
ordinary least squares (as a representation of a worst-case scenario for the technology 
available to this hypothetical policymaker). 
It is often argued10 that at least part of the economic woes from the 1970s was 
caused by economic policy mistakes. In particular, that policymakers wrongly identified a 
trade-off between output and inflation, and tried to exploit it, generating inflation without 
achieving the expected response of output, and then seeing their estimation of the trade-off 
becoming a lot less advantageous, once the policies had been applied. Lucas (1976) 
presents an explanation of why this could have happened: they were estimating Phillips 
curves, and did not take into account how their policies would affect the coefficients of those 
reduced-form models. The suggested solution to this problem is to use structural models, 
with deep parameters whose estimation should remain constant over time, invariant to policy 
changes. The Smets-Wouters model represents the state-of-the-art evolution of such 
models, extended and expanded to better fit the data, and similar, for example, to models in 
use nowadays at many central banks. In this section, then, I will try to answer the following 
question: if the policymakers of the 1970s had been using the Smets-Wouters model instead 
of their old-style Phillips curves, would they have identified similar trade-offs, and would they 
also have found them to be smaller-than-originally-expected after the policy was 
implemented? That is to say, would policy evaluation derived from the DSGE model have 
been constant around the time when the policy shock was implemented? 
                                                                          
10. See, for example Fuhrer et al (2009). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 14 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1310 
The results from the exercise are summarised in Chart 2, which plots the impulse 
response functions from each estimated set of parameters, always to a 1 point shock to 
interest rates, and in Chart 3, which takes the responses of output and inflation from Chart 2 
and plots the evolution over time of the ratio between them. This is similar to the slope of the 
Phillips curve, but it has some advantages: the impulse response functions summarise the 
short-term and long-term trade-offs, and the time frame for each of them; and in practice it is 
often IRFs and not parameter values which are used to derive policy advice11. 
The exercise is analogous to recursive estimation12. Initially, policymakers estimate 
the Smets-Wouters model with sample period 1948-1967, and look at the impulse response 
function for a monetary policy shock (a reduction of interest rates of 1 percentage point below 
the value predicted by the model’s Tayor rule). Then, year after year, when new data become 
available, they extend the end of the sample period (first to 1948-1968, then 1948-1969, etc), 
re-estimate the model, and look at the new IRF for a monetary policy shock13. 
                                                                          
11. Additionally, the usual form in which the Phillips curve in DSGE models is presented (as a relationship between 
inflation and marginal cost) is not suitable for this exercise, since it relies on the fact that marginal cost is proportional to 
the output gap, which is not the case when the parameters of the model are not constant. A form that relates output and 
inflation can be derived, but the IRF ratio would still be more relevant, since it is closer to what policymakers look at, and 
it is a better summary of the dynamic trade-off. 
12. This switch from rolling-window estimation in the previous section to recursive estimation here is because rolling 
windows are better at showing the evolution of the parameters over time, but I believe recursive estimation is closer 
to what central banks actually do. In any case, I have checked that the results would be very similar with a rolling-
window exercise. 
13. The shock is always a 1 percentage point reduction in interest rates on impact, but may be slightly different in the 
following quarters, depending on the inertia implied by the re-estimation of the model; in any case, differences in this 
path of interest rates are relatively small, as shown in Chart 2. 
Chart 2: pseudo‐real‐time exercise: impulse response functions
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The most interesting period is the one around 1970-1972. In the foreword of Fuhrer 
et al (2009), Paul A. Samuelson cites the very early 1970s as a point of maximum monetary 
push14. And the full-sample estimation of the Smets-Wouters model also identifies expansive 
monetary-policy shocks in these years. Consequently, this period is a good one to check 
whether the quantification that the model gives for the effects of a monetary policy shock is 
invariant, or whether it is changing as the shocks are implemented in the real world.  
As shown in Chart 315, the initial estimation (1948-1967) shows a very positive trade-
off between output and inflation: a reduction in interest rates generates an increase in output 
in the first year that is twice as big as the increase in inflation16; on average over the first three 
years, this ratio of the responses of output and inflation is close to 2.5. The estimated sacrifice 
ratio remains approximately constant until the 1948-1970 sample. Then, as monetary 
expansion takes place in the real world in 1970-1972, my hypothetical policymakers re-
estimate the model, and find that the response of output and employment to this monetary 
shock is quickly getting smaller. The associated effect on inflation is also diminishing rather 
quickly, but by the time the sample period has changed to 1948-1973 (i.e. right after the 
expansionary monetary shocks were implemented in the real world), the estimated trade-off 
has already changed dramatically17: the ratio of the responses of output and inflation has 
gone down to one in the first year, and 1.4 on average over the first three years18. 
                                                                          
14. In fact, he relates this particular episode to a “Machiavellian purpose of ensuring Nixon’s 1972 reelection”. 
15. As an example, a value of 2 in the graph for a 3-year horizon means that an interest rate shock that increases the 
level of output by 2% on average over three years, also increases inflation by one percentage point on average over that 
same period. 
16. For reference, with the coefficients from Smets and Wouters (2007), who use data from 1966-2004 in the estimation 
of the model, the response of output is 1.6 times bigger than the response of inflation over the first year, and 1.75 times 
bigger on average over the first three years. 
17. Whether this change is significative or not may be of little interest: if policymakers see that their estimation changes in 
a noticeable way, they may investigate why that happened, and whether the change is significative or not, but regardless 
of the results they will use the new impulse response functions for policy evaluation anyway, therefore the shift does not 
need to be significative in order to be relevant. 
18. The results of the rolling-window estimations of Section 2, and of the recursive estimation presented here, could be 
biased because of the difficulty in estimating with relatively short samples the parameters that characterise the steady 
state of the economy: long-run empirical regularities are usually detected by using a 30-year sample or larger. This is 
important because the dynamics of the modeled economy are defined as differences from this badly-identified steady 
state. So, as a robustness check, I have repeated all of these rolling-window and recursive estimations, but fixing the 
steady-state parameters to their estimated parameters from the longest sample (1948-2011). Results are relatively 
similar, if somewhat more muted. In the rolling-window estimation, most of the parameters still show strong indications 
of instability, but for example the variability of the estimated parameter for price indexation is visibly smaller when the 
steady-state parameters are kept constant throughout the exercise. For the recursive estimation presented here, the 
estimated sacrifice ratio between output and inflation still shows a very relevant fall from the 1948-1970 to the 1948-
1973 estimations, but it is somewhat smaller: for horizons of 1-3 years, instead of falling from 2.1-2.6 to 1.1-1.4 (a 50% 
drop), with a constant steady state, the estimated sacrifice ratio falls from 1.7-1.9 to 1.0-1.4 (a 30-40% drop). 
As an additional robustness check, I have also estimated the model keeping the Calvo and indexation parameters fixed 
at their estimated values from the 1948-2011 sample. This causes other parameters to display slightly larger shifts 
(mainly habits and the elasticity of labour supply to the real wage), and the results remain unaltered, at least qualitatively. 
Around the policy experiment, the estimated sacrifice ratio between output and inflation falls slightly less, and a bit more 
slowly, but the shift is still there: the ratio falls from 2.5-2.8 in the 1948-1970 estimation to 1.7-2.1 in the 1948-1974 
estimation (a 25-30% drop). Then I have also repeated this exercise keeping all parameters at their estimated value from 
the 1948-2011 sample, except for the Calvo and indexation parameters. In this case, the shift in the estimated trade-off 
completely disappears. This suggests that it is not these reduced-form mechanisms that are driving the result, but other 
–supposedly structural– parameters. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 16 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1310 
 
This is not fundamentally different from what these virtual policymakers would have 
experienced had they estimated a simple Phillips curve (with the same specification that is 
used in example 5.3 of Lucas (1976): ?? ? ? ? ??? ? ?? ) using ordinary least squares. As is 
shown in Chart 4, the estimated slope of this simple Phillips curve would have evolved in a 
similar fashion to what we have seen in the IRFs of the Smets-Wouters model, with a marked 
downward shift between 1969 and 1975. That is to say, Chart 4 shows that the tool that the 
policymakers of the 1970s were using to evaluate the effects of a monetary policy shock (the 
slope of a Phillips curve) displayed serious instability issues around the time when such 
shocks were implemented (1970-1972); but Charts 2 and 3 also show that IRFs from the 
Smets-Wouters model (the tool that this model has to evaluate the effects of a monetary 
policy shock) would have displayed very similar issues in that period too. 
 
Chart 3: pseudo‐real‐time exercise: IRFs: effect on output / effect on inflation
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Chart 4: pseudo‐real‐time exercise: simple Phillips curve estimation
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This similarity does not necessarily mean that the policymakers of the 1970s would 
have taken the same policy decisions if they were using the Smets-Wouters model for their 
policy advice. But it does mean that in terms of parameter invariance and its effect on 
econometric policy evaluation, the estimated DSGE model would not have done a lot better 
than the old-style Phillips curve. The lessons that policymakers would have drawn from 
Smets-Wouters are not fundamentally different from those they were extracting from their 
reduced-form models19, and a similar experience (believing there is a trade-off that can be 
exploited, trying to exploit it, and then seeing this policy fail and the estimation of the trade-off 
shift) seems entirely plausible. 
There is no definitive proof here that the shift in the estimated parameters, and in the 
resulting impulse response functions, is due to the economic policy implemented in those 
years. Those were convoluted times, and many things were happening all at the same time. 
But I observe a big change in the evaluation of the effects of monetary policy immediately 
after this policy is implemented, and Cogley and Yagihashi (2010) and Chang, Kim and 
Schorfheide (2011) show that a misspecified structural model would behave in this way. Also, 
even if the shift is due to something other than the monetary policy shocks of those years, the 
simple fact that the impulse response shifts just when the policymakers would want it to be 
most stable is a problem; it may not be the textbook case of the Lucas critique (where the 
policy itself is what causes the shift in the evaluation that the model makes of said policy), but 
in any case it would be bad news for econometric policy evaluation using DSGE models: 
something happened that was not envisaged by the model, and which made its evaluation of 
the effects of economic policy quantitatively inaccurate. 
An additional point of interest could be to determine which parameters are 
responsible for this shift in the impulse response functions from the estimated DSGE model. I 
have tried to identify them with the following procedure: I start with the parameters from the 
1948-1970 estimation, and take note of the ratio of IRFs presented in Chart 4; I then start 
changing one parameter at a time to its value in the 1948-1973 estimation, and see how that 
ratio of IRFs responds to the change. The results depend on the order in which the 
parameters are changed from one value to another, but from looking at numerous alternative 
orderings it is safe to say that nearly all of the change comes from the shifts in the Calvo 
parameter for wages (which moves from 0.84 to 0.75, meaning that average wage duration 
changes from 6 quarters to 4 quarters), the parameter for habits (which moves from 0.47 to 
0.75), the elasticity of labour supply to the real wage (from 1.71 to 2.48), and the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution (from 1.01 to 1.23). 
                                                                          
19. The biggest difference may be that the more modern model imposes that this particular trade-off can only exist in the 
short run. Given the short-term goal that Paul A. Samuelson attributes to the monetary expansion of the early 1970s, in 
practice this would probably have made little difference. 
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4 Conclusions 
Previous papers had already shown that the estimation of allegedly deep parameters from 
supposedly structural DSGE models was far from stable: Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-
Ramirez (2007), in their very elegant set-up, find noticeable drift in the parameters, whereas 
Inoue and Rossi (2008), with their well-crafted statistical tests, find a significant structural 
change in many of those parameters. More theoretical papers, such as Cogley and Yagihashi 
(2010) and Chang, Kim and Schorfheide (2011), have shown that something like this may 
happen because misspecification of the model makes its supposedly-structural parameters 
non-invariant to policy shocks, sometimes with major consequences for econometric policy 
evaluation. 
This paper, apart from providing further indication of this parameter instability in the 
data, has looked at how the drift of coefficients in estimated DSGE models would have shifted 
the policy advice derived from them around the time when these policies were implemented. 
Since they should be invariant to policy changes, DSGE models were supposed to be the 
recipe that would provide policymakers with robust advice; but, as shown in the pseudo-real-
time exercise in section 3, this parameter drift means that the advice provided by these 
modern models would not have differed fundamentally from that which the policymakers of 
the 1970s could derive from their old-style Phillips curves. A model such as Smets-Wouters 
–similar to those in use today at many central banks– would have identified a major short-
term trade-off between inflation and output if estimated with data from 1948 to 1970, whereas a 
re-estimation three years later, after a big monetary expansion occurred, would have shown that 
the trade-off was in fact much less advantageous. This was exactly the problem that Lucas 
(1976) illustrated for reduced-form Phillips curves. 
Of course, all of this does not mean DSGE models are useless and should be 
abandoned, but it does indicate that they are not as flawless as many people think. For a 
start, they are not fully structural, since, as Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007) 
emphasised, they include several reduced-form mechanisms. But, even beyond that, as 
shown by Inoue and Rossi (2008), supposedly deep parameters change over time too, 
perhaps in response to changes in economic policy. And, of course, economic models have 
advanced a lot over the last 40 years, but the new models, while representing an 
improvement over the old ones in many respects, could eventually lead to similar mistakes 
when used to evaluate the effects of economic policy, especially in the short and medium 
term. Using microfounded models is not enough to avoid the Lucas critique, since, as shown 
by Cogley and Yagihashi (2010) and by Chang, Kim and Schorfheide (2011), and by the 
pseudo-real-time exercise in this paper, being reduced-form and being misspecified can have 
very similar effects in terms of parameter drift after a change in economic policy. 
What should be done then? Trying to perfect DSGE models, bringing them closer to 
reality, finding misspecification issues and looking for variants that are resilient to the kind of 
problem presented here, all seem like good ways forward. We should also try to keep their 
estimation up-to-date –in order to use a version of the model that is as close to recent reality as 
possible– and watch out for parameter drift. But we should probably also worry a little less 
about the risks of adding reduced-form mechanisms or non-rational expectations to these 
models. A simple mention of the Lucas critique should not be enough to disregard these 
solutions, since we do not really have –as yet– an alternative that is truly immune to that critique. 
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